The implementation of a supervision and incentive process for identical workers may lead to wage variance that stems from employer and employee optimization. The harder it is to assess the nature of the labor output, the more important such a process becomes, and the influence of such a process on wage development growth. The dynamic model presented in this paper shows that an employer will choose to pay a worker a starting wage that is less than what he deserves, resulting in a wage profile that fits the "classic" profile in the human-capital literature. The wage profile and wage variance rise at times of technological advancements, which leads to increased turnover as older workers are replaced by younger workers due to a rise in the relative marginal cost of the former.
Introduction
In widely used labor-market models, homogeneous workers who work under identical conditions receive identical wages. This outcome prevalent even when one shifts from the basic models of a competitive market and human capital to more complex models of bargaining and efficiency wage. According to these models, workers' wages are determined on the basis of their demographic indicators, 1 the characteristics of their enterprise or sector, 2 and institutional factors. 3 It has been found, however, that in the past two decades these indicators manage to explain only part of the wage-setting process. 4 In this paper, we use the theoretical framework of "supervision" and "efficiency wage" to explain the influence of supervision and incentive process on wage disparities, especially in time of technological advances.
Worker incentivization and supervision processes are fundamental to a firm's existence. 5 The relevant literature on this topic focuses mainly on the outcomes of this supervision, particularly its positive effect on the worker's level of efficiency and effort, and also on the adverse implications of supervision due to the crowding-out phenomenon. 6 The importance of personal supervision as opposed to team supervision, 7 and the desired supervision and hierarchical structure 8 are also important sub-topics in this literature. Given the development of 1 Katz & Murphy, 1991; Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, 1993; Acemoglu, 1996 Acemoglu, , 1998 Acemoglu, , 1999 Acemoglu, , 2002 Caselli, 1999; Galor & Moav, 2000; Aghion, Howitt, & Violante, 2002; David, Katz & Kearney. 2006. 2 Davis & Haltiwanger , 1991; DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 1996; Entorf, & Kramarz, 1997 ; Lee, 1999; Neumark, 0 200 . 3 Card & DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2008. 4 -3 -production processes that yield hard-to-estimate outputs, the importance of incentivation and supervision has grown in recent decades, especially in sectors such as high-tech and financial services, where much is invested in employee evaluation and its outcome remuneration. This paper emphasizes the link among the diverse parameters that define the supervision process, wage development and its variance. Workers in the model choose the level of effort that is optimal for them in light of the supervision level, starting wage, and level of incentivization, all of which are determined by a profit-maximizing employer. By solving the simultaneous model and analyzing the results over time, particularly at a time of technological change, we obtain an explanation for some of the unexplained increase in wage variance in recent decades.
In Section 2 of the paper, the framework of the model is presented and the worker's optimal behavior is examined. In Section 3, specific functions for wage and utility equations are defined.
In Section 4, the model is completed with the inclusion of rules of optimal employer behavior and examination of how wage variance is explained by exogenous factors, such as cost of checking and technological improvements. Section 5 concludes.
The Worker
In the model described, the worker chooses his optimal level of effort at work. His employer may monitor this level by supervising his, but only at a cost. The utility of the representative worker in each period rises with an increase in consumption and decreases with an increase in effort. To simplify, let us assume that a worker has a additive 9 utility function that does not change during the period (much like the function presented by Wellisz, 1978, 1979) : represents total inactivity). We assume that in each period the individual consumes his entire wage and has no other sources of income.
Each worker has a potential work life of T periods. In each period, the worker maximizes his expected utility from that period onward: 10
where  is the time discount factor, 0 << 1.
Before hiring a worker, the employer discloses his payment structure and invites the employee to take it or leave it. The employer commits to pay the worker base wage w0, which may increase if the worker demonstrates strong effort on the job or attains specific goals agreed upon with the employer. We assume that the employer will give similar workers identical base wages and that, since employees have the same preferences, they will choose the same initial level of effort.
In accordance with the employment contract, the employee has p likelihood of being evaluated in each period, irrespective of whether or not he was evaluated in the past. If the worker is not evaluated during a certain period, his wage will remain at the previous period's level; if he is evaluated, it will be recalculated on the basis of his effort and the production that it yields. His bonus or penalty will be calculated commensurate with the gap between the wage he deserves and the wage he received in the last period. The wage agreement concluded with the worker may be defined for each period t as follows: 10 We assume that the worker makes no ab initio commitment to a future level of effort; instead, in each individual period he chooses the effort level that is optimum for his at this time. See, for example, Hashimoto, 1981, and Hall & Lazear, 1984 . Alternately, one may assume the existence of several groups of workers and that, even though all workers sampled in each of the groups are homogeneous, the employer acts under conditions of uncertainty as to the type of worker sampled.
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It can be assumed that if the worker is evaluated his wage will be changed in accordance with his previous earnings. We found that the main results of the model, given the foregoing wage function, do not change. In an alternative wage structure, bonuses are construed as nonrecurrent wage increases. If a worker excels in a certain period, he receives a one-time bonus that does not affect his wage in the future. This type of structure, prevalent in the business world, is discussed below with the help of numerical dynamic programming.
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A comparative statistics analysis of the influence of the parameters on effort when there is only one period appears in Appendix 1.
wage is dependent on whether he was evaluated in the current period on the basis of his previous wage, taking into consideration whether he was rewarded or penalized for his level of production. The dynamics of this process are shown in Figure 2 .1. It may be seen that at the end of Period 2 the workers' wages spread in four different directions, reflecting the difference in their effort/production during this period and the sampling in both periods. In Table 2 .1, the various wage levels are shown in accordance with the process defined in Figure 2 .1: Figure 1 .1) 
We now examine the employee's considerations recursively. We assume that he has reached the beginning of Period 2, that he knows the wage that he received in Period 1, and that he uses this knowledge to choose his level of effort in Period 2. In other words, he will maximize his effective expectancy in Period 2:
If the employee was sampled in Period 1, Let us assume that the effort level in Period 2 is the optimal level of effort in this period:
The first-order condition for the maximization of the utility function yields optimal rules of behavior of the employee:
At the beginning of Period 1, the employee knows the terms of his optimal behavior in Period 2 and will maximize his expected utility function for both periods:
The optimal amount of effort for the employee in Period 1 will defined as:
U e e  and, arising from the first-order condition for maximizing the utility function, we get the employee's optimal rules of behavior:
At the optimum, the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of consumption is fixed and equal to the sampling rate. For a deeper analysis of the relations among the variables, a specific definition of the utility and wage functions is needed. This is provided in the next section.
Characterization of Utility and Wage Functions

Additive Utility Function in Consumption and Effort
Let us assume that the utility of consumption is logarithmic and that the utility of effort is proportionate to this level, i.e.:
where b is the parameter. Calvo and Wellisz (1979) assumed, for the function defined in Equation 3.2, that the effort level is multiplied by a constant. At this stage, for simplicity's sake, we assume that this constant is equal to 1. This assumption will be removed for reasons spelled out in Part 4 below. offset in future periods. If, however, his effort levels gradually increase from period to period, his wage will also increase in each future period (Figure 3 .1). Assuming: w0=0.5, e0=0.3, α=0.4, p=1, T=5. We assume that the effort level is exogenous, an assumption that will be removed in the next paragraph. * Effort increases by 5% each period.
The expected utility of a worker in Period 1 is:
A Bellman equation is used to find the optimal effort level - 
where: remain in which a level of effort can influence wage decreases (when t =T, we get  in its minimal value, equal to 1). Thus, the level of effort also decreases over time. By plugging the optimal effort level (Formula 3.6) into the wage formula (Formula 3.3), we get the wage level for each period t:
where wt-1 in Period 1 is the base wage (w0).
We find that the wage that the employee will receive if sampled is independent of his past wage and dependent only on the parameters of the models. 15, 16 This independence significantly narrows the wage possibilities that exist at the end of each period, making it relatively easy to calculate wage distribution even for multiple periods at a time. For example, the worker will receive in period T the wage that is determined for Work Period 2 -
. After T periods, there will be (T+1) wage possibilities, distributed as follows:
15 This is due to the definition of the utility function, in which the marginal utility of idleness is constant and the wage function is proportional to effort.
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For simplicity's sake, the model presented shows a Marcov process, in which the wage paid to a worker in each period is a dependency of the previous period only, irrespective of the earlier past. Alternatively, a more complex structure may be presented, in which wage in each period is a dependency of the worker's employment history, e.g., the number of periods that passed since his latest sampling. Such models provide additional explanations for the wage scatter but do not affect the main results. Table 3 .1 and in extreme cases where the worker is sampled in each period.
The wage expectancy profile described in the figure resembles the "classic wage profile", in which wage rises at an accelerated rate in the first few years and then begins to settle slowly or even to decrease. This wage profile and, specifically, the accelerated increase in wage in the first few years, stem from the base wage being too low for the worker's level of effort, ) ( 0 t e w w  .
If the employer decides to compensate the worker so that ) ( 0 t e w w  , the wage profile would be completely horizontal; if the employer overcompensates the employee, ) ( 0 t e w w  , the wage profile will begin to decrease from the outset. To analyze the modularity of the effect on wage variance, we first check the results for an individual during one period. In accordance with Formula 3.6, the optimal effort level -* ethat a worker will choose is:
For simplicity, it is assumed from now on that b=1.
That is, an increase in the sampling rate, the size of the bonus (penalty), and the starting wage will induce an increase in the worker's level of effort during the work period. Conversely, an increase in the utility coefficient for idleness will induce a decrease in the worker's level of 
In other words, the worker's level of effort, wage profile, and wage variance are all defined by the parameters included in the contract offered to his (Equation 2.8). Take, for example, the wage variance described in Figure 3 .3 as a function of two parameters in the employment contract: base wage and bonus/penalty rate. It may be easily seen that wage variance will be larger when one's base wage is lower than one is worth ) ( Wage variance p -
Cobb-Douglas Production Function
In this section we assume that worker's utility function for period t is Cobb-Douglas and not additive as above: 17
where the variables are as defined above and β and  are parameters:
We also assume here that in a period when the worker is evaluated, he receive a nonrecurrent bonus that is not considered part of wage and will not affect his wage if he is evaluated again.
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This means that in each period t the worker receives wage t w and bonus t B , defined as follows: This definition of the bonus would have no qualitative effect on the outcomes in the utility function set forth in the previous section.
an effort level of 0.5. We can see that the outcome of the Cobb-Douglas production function, much like that of the additive function, the optimal effort level decreases in tandem with the expected number of periods. Unlike the earlier example, however, in the Cobb-Douglas production function a higher wage in a previous period will causes a decrease in future effort level 
A worker's wage development over time is an outcome of his effort level. Take, for example, the extreme case in which the worker is sampled in each period and given starting wage (w 0 ) 0.4. The effort track that the worker chooses is highlighted (the number is underlined) in Table 3 .2. The wage and bonus that he will receive as a result are described in Table 3 .3.
Looking at the table, it is easy to see that effort and wage development are not monotonous in the first six work periods, whereas from the seventh period both begin to decrease over time due to the finite time horizon. Optimal effort 
In the previous example, we chose an extreme case in which the worker is sampled in each work period. In reality, a worker is sampled, and in turn his wage distribution in future periods is determined, with a probability of p. An example of wage distribution in each of ten periods (where p=0.2) is presented in Table 3 .4. The probability presented in each cell in the table is for all wage values in a defined category. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 a Assuming:
The table shows the total probability of receiving a wage within the defined wage bracket from the lowest value (not inclusive) to the highest (inclusive).
The development of wage expectancy and variance are presented in Figure 3 .4, which describes the variables for a timeframe of ten and twenty periods. Here as in the previous section, wage expectancy behaves in a manner similar to the development of the classic wage profile, ascending in the first periods with a decreasing slope and decreasing later. An increase in wage variation over time was also found. 
The Employer
We complete the model by adding the optimal maximization of the employer. The output of the worker in period t is commensurate with his level of effort and is not dependent on other workers' output and effort (an additive assumption). The production function (y t ) is defined as follows:
f(e y t t t t
The employer benefits from the revenues that his employees' labor generates in each period. His revenue function (scaled to one worker) is:
where  is the employer's discount factor.
Using first-order conditions, differentiation with respect to p yields:
c dp w dE dp de e f 
Defining p*, 0 w *, and α* as optimal parameters for employers who satisfy equations 4.3-4.5, we examine their influence on the worker's effort level, wage, and wage variance. For simplicity's sake, we first examine the model for one period. We assume that the producer produces under a constant return to scale. This function is suitable for a fixed wage per unit of effort, much like the wage function defined in Section 3:
And the discounted revenue for the employer is:
We insert into the revenue function (Formula 4.7) the wage function defined in Section 3 and the optimal effort level that the worker will choose for the additive productivity function:
 
What we get is that the employer will act -optimally -according to the following rules:
We find that at the optimum, the employer will choose a lower base wage than what the worker deserves for his efforts ( ) ( ) 1 (
. This policy will lead to different wages among identical workers and wage expectations similar to the "classical" wage profile (as seen in Figure 3 .2). An increase in supervision cost will induce a decrease in the optimum employee sampling rate (p) to a raise in optimum base wage (w0) and relative bonus (α). These will lead to decreases in the worker's effort level, wage, and wage variance.
Examining the effect of an increase in marginal production (technological advancements) on wage expectancy and variance is more complicated because in this case the worker is influenced by two factors -an increase in effort level due to a change in the parameters of his labor contract and an increase in exchange per unit of effort due to a marginal increase in output for that unit. We assume that wage as a function of effort will be determined by the following (this definition of wage function is an expansion of the function defined in Equation 3.3) 19 :
, and λ 1 < , a choice which integrates models of specific human capital where the revenue is divided between the employer and employee. 20 An increase in marginal production will lead to an increase in the employer's optimum sampling rate and optimum base wage paid. The rate of the optimal bonus/penalty, however, will decrease. Due to the large gap between the wage that the employee deserves for his efforts and his base wage the total bonus/penalty amount will increase despite its rate decrease.
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See note 16 above.
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In a general equilibrium solution, the optimal λ may be tested for. This solution, however, exceeds the purpose of this paper. An analysis of the effect of technological advancements on optimal employee and employer policies over time is complicated and necessitates the use of numerical planning. This plan calculates the sampling amount, the base wage, and the relative size of the bonus that maximizes the value of discounted revenues. By using these optimal parameters, we can find the worker's optimal long-term effort level, wage expectancy, and wage variance.
We find that technological advancements raise the wage profile over time due to (a) an increase in wage per unit of effort, (b) an increase in the sampling rate, and (c) an increase in the effort level, in both the additive utility and the Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Technological changes will also cause wage variance to rise due to the rise in sampling rate and the gap in salary between sampled workers and un-sampled worker.
We also found that technological advancement will, raise the cost of employing older workers (calculated by subtracting their marginal output from wage expectancy) relative to 21 Furthermore, the normalized SD coefficient in wage expectancy will rise. This condition obtains when the cost of training new workers is low enough. In this paper, we assume zero training cost. Wage Expectancy
Wage expectancy minus the value of marginal output Periods:
Before technological advancements After technological advancements
Conclusion
In the model described, an employer's evaluation system, comprising of incentives and penalties, causes different wage development among identical workers. The incentive and punitive measures are proportional to the worker's effort level in relation to his wage. As a result of the optimization of workers' and employers' behaviors, wage differences among workers develop inevitably because the employer will choose to pay his workers a starting wage that is less than their starting effort level.
As a result of the dynamic structure of the model, workers will choose to lower their level of effort in their later periods in the labor market. For this reason and due to the sampling process, their wage expectancy profile will fit the "classic" profile described in the humancapital literature -rising quickly in the first work periods, gradually evening out, and falling in later periods.
At times of technological advancements, wage expectancy and variance will grow.
Additionally, it will also increase the gap between the worker's wage and his marginal output value in a way that motivates the employer to replace older workers with younger ones.
In this paper we offer an alternative explanation for some of the most important characters of the labor market in recent decades. In times of technological advancements, when it is difficult to estimate output and production, explanations that focus on the supervision and incentive process increase in importance. Single-Period Model: The influence of the supervision parameters on the effort level.
The utility function is: -with a rise in the rate bonus, the direction of the effect is not clear.
